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BILL CLINTON'S "THREE NOES" AND 
TAIWAN'S FUTURE 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
University of Richmond 
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Diplomatic historians and political scientists have 
warned that when great powers make war or love, the 
smaller countries nearby feel the tremors.1 As they look 
back, President Bill Clinton's 1998 summit visit to China 
marked the emergence of a new world order: With the 
end of the Cold War, China is poised to become a poten-
tial superpower, and its future evolution will have great 
implications for the U.S. "For better or worse, the U.S.-
Chinese relationship seems destined to be one of the 
principal pivots in international relations well into the 21st 
century," as Walter Russell Mead asserts.2 That much is 
clear, but what is not clear is how to deal with this rising 
power. 
1. Summit in Context: Is Engagement Actually a 
Realist Strategy? 
Historically, coping with a rising great power has sel-
dom been easy, and conflicts have often occurred during 
1 An Indian . saying has a slightly different twist: "When two elephants 
make wars or love, the grass gets hurt. But when one elephant falls down, it still 
lands on the grass." This saying had been used to describe the superpower 
relationships during the Cold War: the two elephants were the two superpowers, 
the grass referred to the Third World, and the fallen elephant was the Former 
Soviet Union. 
2 Walter Russell Mead, "Clinton Does Well to Try to Cooperate with 
China," The International Herald Tribune (26 June 1998): 8. 
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periods of "power transitions."3 And unfortunately stu-
dents of world politics have not come nearer a consensus 
on this perennial issue. Their differences reflect more 
fundamental disagreements about the basic forces in 
international relations. 
The current debate on how to deal with a rising China 
(or what David Shambaugh calls "The Great China 
Debate") epitomizes this quandary.4 
From one perspective [realism], China's ascent is the latest 
example of the tendency for rising powers to alter the 
global balance of power in potentially dangerous ways, 
especially as their growing influence makes them more 
ambitious. From another perspective [liberalism], the key 
to China's future conduct is whether its behavior will be 
modified by its integration into world markets and by the 
(inevitable?) spread of democratic principles. From yet 
another viewpoint [constructivism], relations between 
China and the rest of the world will be shaped by issues of 
culture and identity: Will China see itself (and be seen by 
others) as a normal member of the world community or a 
singular society that deserves special treatment?5 
Evidently, the Clinton Administration embraced lib-
eralism, seeking a "comprehensive engagement" with 
China and rejecting either containment or isolation. 
Attempts to isolate or contain such an important (but 
often difficult) country are admittedly neither desirable 
3 A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
4 Two good articles review this debate: Christopher Layne, "A House of 
Cards: American Strategy Toward China," World Policy Journal 14(3)(Fall 1997): 
77-95; and David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: Cooperation or 
Confrontation?" Current History (September 1997): 241-5. The two books often 
juxtaposed in this debate are Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great 
Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1997) and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict 
with China (New York: Knopf, 1997). 
5 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," 
Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 29-30. 
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nor feasible. However, critics contend that Clinton's 
China policy seem to mistakenly treat "engagement" as a 
policy, rather than a strategy (for carrying out a yet-to-be-
defined policy); an end in itself, rather than a means. 
They also argue that the Clinton Administration has 
failed to attach consequences to its engagement policy -
i.e., reward cooperative behavior and punish uncoopera-
tive behavior. One perceptive writer thus calls for 
"destructive engagement": 
American policy toward China must honor and balance and 
mix ... strategy, morality, and economy ... [S]trategic ... 
and moral considerations must override economic consider-
ations. As a consequence of China's determined pursuit of 
military hegemony in Asia, and its mischievous diffusion of 
missile technology and its systematic violation of human 
rights, the United States, in the name of its values and inter-
ests, must engage China adversarially (emphasis added).6 
Clinton's approach to China seems fundamentally 
incompatible with his overall foreign policy orientation, 
which anchors on "democratic enlargement. "7 Some 
scholars thus argue that the Administration continues to 
deal with Beijing following the realpolitik pattern estab-
lished in the 1970s, without a companion policy of effec-
tively promoting democratization in China.8 
Political scientist Arthur Waldron explains Beijing's 
behavior and its challenge to the U.S.: 
As long as the Soviet Union existed, its menace was enough 
to keep Peking from doing anything that would endanger 
the relationship with the United States. But once that 
6 "Destructive Engagement," The New Republic (10 March 1997): 9. 
7 Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," 
Foreign Policy 106(Spring1997): 110-27; and National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake's speech on September 21, 1993, "From Containment to Enlargement: 
Current Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective." Transcript in Vital Speeches 
60(1)(15 October 1993): 13-9. 
s Arthur Waldron, "Framers of US Policy Need Updated Mindset," The 
Free China Journal (7 August 1998): 7. 
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threat disappeared, no consensus governed any aspect of 
mainland Chinese security behavior. . . . The result was the 
reemergence of all the border and other disputes that 
Peking had put in deep freeze while the Russian bear still 
prowled - involving Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea 
and India.9 
The stakes are high for the United States, as it has 
vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region. It is thus under-
standable that Clinton sought to incorporate China into 
the international community as a responsible great 
power. However, his eager courting of Beijing also 
caused unintended consequences: confusion and anxiety 
among those Asian countries that had delicate relation-
ships with Beijing.10 
The geopolitical ramifications of Clinton's trip 
prompted commentators to compare it with Nixon's 1972 
trip to China, which he called "the trip that changed the 
world."11 Some analysts argue that Clinton's trip took 
place under conditions mostly dictated by Beijing.12 
Undoubtedly summits are important political events 
9 Waldron, "Framers." 
10 William Pfaff, "U.S. Policy: Kowtow to China, Hector to Japan, Dismiss 
India," International Herald Tribune (18 June 1998): 9. 
11 Ann Scott Tyson, "Clinton vs. Nixon: Changed US Views on Trip to 
China," The Christian Science Monitor (24 June 1998): 3. 
12 William Safire, President Nixon's speechwriter, criticized President 
Clinton for agreeing to "eight yeses" as the price for his China trip: (1) Yes to the 
purification of Tiananmen Square; (2) Yes to China's insistance on exclusivity in 
the presidential itinerary; (3) Yes to giving China a veto over the American 
President's visiting party; (4) Yes to China's pretense of being an "emerging" 
country that deserves special treatment in entering the World Trade 
Organization; (5) Yes to China's harsh treatment of dissidents; (6) Yes to Jiang's 
need for superpower support of his new cult of personality; (7) Yes to China's 
decision to delay joining the Missile Technology Control Regime; and (8) Yes to 
the "strategic partnership" desired by the Chinese leadership. "The Eight 
Yeses," The New York Time, op-ed (9 July 1998): A27. See also Rober Kagan 
and William Kristo!, "Stop Playing by China's Rules," The New York Time, op-ed 
(22 June 1998): Al9. 
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between major powers, especially for a rising power such 
as China, which eagerly seeks respect and recognition. 
The summit did achieve notable results. However, 
the goodwill generated by the summit, in particular the 
live TV broadcast of the post-summit joint news confer-
ence showing Clinton debating with his host, Jiang 
Zemin, seems to have dissipated as a result of China's 
recent crackdown of democracy movement and U.S.'s 
plan for a missile defense system.13 
Meanwhile, the geopolitical reverberations from the 
summit kept unfolding. Some analysts say that Clinton's 
policy of treating China as a "strategic partner" risked 
upsetting the delicate balance of power in the Asia-
Pacific, alienating America's democratic allies in the 
region, 14 and aggravating the security quandary in South 
Asia.15 
Only history can judge whether this "strategic part-
nership" will portend peace or war in Asia. But an 
increasingly powerful China that is assertive on issues 
that it considers crucial to its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity will clearly test America's resolve, tactic, and 
13 Elizabeth Becker, "Missile Plan Puts U.S. in Quandary with China," The 
New York Times (22 January 1999): AS. 
14 William Pfaff argued, "Mr. Clinton suddenly - implicitly, but 
unmistakably - declared China the United State's principal ally in Asia, at the 
expense of Japan, India, and Taiwan ... [And] the reasoning which led the 
Clinton Adminstration to do this remains an enigma." "Clinton's China Visit 
Signals a Major Reversal of Alliances," International Herald Tribune (6 July 
1998): 10. 
15 Michael Yahuda, a British expert on Chinese foreign policy, points out 
two flaws in the new partnership: "First, it rests on an exaggeration of what was 
accomplished so as to excite expectations that cannot be realized. . . . 
Disappointment ... cannot be far away. Second, by placing engagement with 
China at the center of his strategic approach to Asia, Mr. Clinton has 
antagonized India without offering it a way into the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty except on Chinese terms that New Delhi can only find demeaning and 
threatening to its strategic interests." "Unrealistic Premises Will Sink this 
'Beijing-Washington Axis,"' International Herald Tribune (4 July 1998): 6. 
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capability. Of central importance is the delicate balanc-
ing act on Taiwan: 
China is not in warlike mood, but it is . . . determined to 
establish its sovereignty over Taiwan, whatever the wishes 
of the Taiwanese. China's rising nationalism will have an 
effect of raising the military cost to America of defending 
the island in any future crisis. This makes America's bal-
ancing act all the more vital but difficult to achieve: neither 
leaning too far towards Taiwan, and so provoking China's 
outright hostility or Taiwan's adventurism, nor tilting so far 
towards China that its leaders think they have a licence to 
grab Taiwan.16 
It is in this context one should understand Bill Clin-
ton's now (in-)famous "three noes" remarks. This paper 
examines the background and effects of Clinton's "three 
noes" statement, and discusses its implications for U.S.-
China-Taiwan relations. 
2. The Three Noes: Plus c'est la meme chose, plus ~a 
change? Or "Much Ado About Nothing"? 
By responding to a question from a Chinese professor 
added in at the last minute with a few seemingly innocu-
ous remarks at a "low-key" but clearly choreographed 
meeting with Shanghai intellectuals on 30 June 1998, 
Clinton became the first U.S. President to publicly state 
the so-called "three noes." He said, 
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that 
we don't support independence for Taiwan, or "two China" 
or "one China, one Taiwan." And we don't believe that 
Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which 
statehood is a requirement.17 
16 "East Asia's Delicate Balance," The Economist (25 July 1998): 19. 
17 John M. Broder, "Clinton Says U.S. Does Not Support Independence for 
Taiwan," The New York Times (1 July 1998): A12. 
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Is this an old policy, or a new policy? Clinton's advis-
ers and some analysts argued that the "three noes" 
remarks were merely to "reaffirm a longstanding pol-
icy."18 If this were true, it is hard to understand the sub-
sequent political firestorm that these "harmless words" 
seemed to generate in the U.S. and Taiwan. 
The criticisms came from all sides of the ideological 
spectrum and appeared non-partisan. The Washington 
Post depicted Clinton's "three noes" statement this way: 
In classic Clinton fashion, the White House tries to have 
things both ways, denying that U.S. policy has changed 
when in fact it has, and not for the better. . . . Mr. Clinton 
has sided with the dictators against democrats. To pretend 
this is no change only heightens the offense.19 
The Wall Street Journal also faulted Clinton's choreo-
graphed "three noes" statement: 
His kowtowing to China's "three noes" over Taiwan is 
likely to set off a cycle of reactions and counter-reactions 
that ultimately will damage rather than improve Sino-
American relations .... That is to say, it was something the 
administration was rather ashamed of, despite the claim 
that it was no change in previous policy .... Anyone who 
reads English can see that this is miles beyond the careful 
language Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger crafted in 
1972.20 
In addition to reactions from media and public opin-
ions, Congress also quickly took actions, passing several 
resolutions to "reaffirm U.S. commitment to Taiwan" and 
"repair the damage that has been done" by President 
18 Mike McCurry, the White House spokesman, tried to downplay the 
importance of Clinton's statements. "The president himself had indicated prior 
to coming here that he would reaffirm longstanding U.S. policy, and he did so." 
Broder, "Clinton Says," and Steve Chapman, "Fantasy vs. Reality on Taiwan," 
The Chicago Tribune, commentary (9 July 1998): 27. 
19 "Siding with Dictators," editorial, The Washington Post (2 July 1998): 
A20. 
20 "Bill's Kowtow," editorial, The Wall Street Journal {2 July 1998): A22. 
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Clinton's comments in China, as Senate Majority Leader 
Trent Lott (R-Miss.) put it.21 The nearly unanimous 
votes on these resolutions indicated that congressional 
support for Taiwan appeared bipartisan. 
On July 10, barely days after Clinton returned from 
China, the Senate unanimously passed Sen. Con. Res. 
107. This resolution affirms Congress' "long-standing 
commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in 
accordance with the Taiwan Relations· Act," including "to 
make available such defense articles and defense services 
in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."22 
Ten days later, the House of Representatives passed a 
similarly worded H. Con. Res. 301.23 Further, it affirms 
Congress' "expectation ... that the future status of Tai-
wan will be determined by peaceful means, and that the 
people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should deter-
mine their own future" and Congress' "strong support ... 
of appropriate membership for Taiwan in international 
financial institutions and other international organiza-
tions." 
Both resolutions also urged the President to seek a 
public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of 
any use of force, or threat of use of force, against "demo-
cratic Taiwan" (Senate version) or "the free people of 
Taiwan" (House version). This was a reiteration of con-
gressional disapproval against China's using force against 
Taiwan. Before Clinton went to China, the House on 
June 9 unanimously passed H. Con. Res. 270. It urged 
him to "seek, at the June summit meeting this year in 
21 "Senate Adopts Pro-Taiwan Resolution," The White House Bulletin (10 
July 1998), from LEXIS-NEXIS. 
22 For the text of Sen. Con. Res. 107, see http://www.taiwaninformation.org! 
policylusconglconresl 07-070898.html. 
23 For the text of H. Con. Res. 301, see http.!lwww.taiwaninformation.org/ 
policyluscong/301house0712798.html. 
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Beijing, a public renunciation by the People's Republic of 
China of any use of force, or threat to use force, against 
democratic Taiwan. "24 
In Taiwan, Clinton's "three noes" remarks evoked a 
sense of betrayal, exasperation, and defiance - like a 
"second derecognition." A Foreign Ministry spokesman 
said, "the United States and mainland China are neither 
entitled nor in a position to negotiate issues concerning 
the Republic of China on Taiwan." "We also hope the 
United States will discuss with the ROC, not mainland 
China, any issues related to Taiwan or relations between 
our two countries. "25 
Foreign Minister Jason Hu criticized Clinton's deci-
sion to become the first American president to announce 
that the U.S. would not support Taiwan independence as 
"unnecessary." "We wish he did not have to say such a 
thing," he said. "We don't think it was necessary. It has 
no relevance to us. "26 
To assuage concerns in Taiwan, Washington dis-
patched an envoy, Richard Bush, Managing Director of 
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) - the de facto 
U.S. embassy since 1979 - to Taipei. Bush reassured the 
Taiwanese government and people that U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan remained unchanged and that the U.S. 
would continue arms sales to Taiwan.27 
24 For the text of H. Con. Res. 270, see http://www.taiwaninformation.org/ 
policyluscong!congres270.html. 
25 "Taiwan Protests Clinton's Remarks," Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service: Daily Report-China (hereafter, FBIS-CHI) (30 June 1998) [FBIS-CHI-
98-181]. 
26 John Pomfret, "Clinton Declaration on Independence Irks Taiwan," The 
Washington Post (1 July 1998): A26. 
27 "AIT Chairman: No Change in US Policy Toward Taiwan," FB/S-CHI (5 
July 1998) [FBIS-CHI-98-186], "AIT Chairman Reassures Taiwan on US Policy," 
FB/S-CHI (8 July 1998) [FBIS-CHI-98-189], and "CNA Reports: AIT Chairman 
Says No Change in Arms Sales," FBIS-CHI (6 July 1998) [FBIS-CHI-98-187]. 
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So has Taiwan overreacted? Or has the Clinton 
Administration understated? What has changed, and 
what has remained, in U.S. policy toward Taiwan? To 
answer these questions, one must study the evolution of 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan. A careful analysis of the key 
documents that have defined U.S.-Taiwan relations over 
the years - namely, the three joint communiques 
between the U.S. and the PRC and the Taiwan Relations 
Act (TRA) - can clarify the confusion. 
I choose to focus on such formal documents, instead 
of oral statements (or informal agreements) such as the 
"three noes" remarks. This is because informal agree-
ments are chosen, as Charles Lipson points out, "to avoid 
formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political 
obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and 
quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modifi-
cation or even renunciation."28 This is probably why 
Clinton selected a particular format - verbal answers to 
a question, rather than signing any formal document, 
such as a fourth communique, as Beijing originally had 
hoped. On the contrary, formal documents provide con-
crete yardsticks for evaluating compliance, thus limiting 
the signatories' freedom of actions by creating disincen-
tives for violations. 
The next section analyzes the evolution of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan through a comparative interpretation of 
these formative documents' language on several key 
questions: "How many Chinas are there?," "Is Taiwan a 
part of China?," "What is China?," "Who are 
Taiwanese?" This comparison also takes into account the 
changing views of the U.S. executive and legislative 
branches and public opinions, as well as governments and 
peoples in Taiwan and the mainland. 
28 Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?" 
International Organization 45(4) (Autumn 1991): 495-538. 
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3. Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Reviewing 
the Formative Documents 
Methodological Remarks 
To analyze the changing U.S.-Taiwan relations, 
including the "three noes," this paper develops a simple 
formal model. Table 1 summarizes the views of the three 
players regarding the status of Taiwan and its relationship 
with the mainland from 1949 (when the Communist gov-
ernment was established on the mainland and the 
Nationalist government moved to Taiwan) to 1972 (when 
Nixon visited the mainland and signed the Shanghai 
Communique). The focus for this period is on the three 
governments (in the U.S. case, the executive branch). 
Unlike in recent years when debates about Taiwan's 
identity and Taiwan's relationship with China can be 
freely and openly held, the authoritarian government of 
the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek during 
this phase vowed to return to China and banned any 
expression of Taiwan independence. Hence, neither pub-
lic opinions that differ from the government's official 
lines nor the oppositions' viewpoints are included for this 
period, but will be included for later ones. On the PRC 
side, since there has never been effective opposition par-
ties and any viewpoints on China-Taiwan relations that 
differ from the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) official 
line have never been tolerated, I will not include them for 
any period. 
Because one of the purposes of this paper is to assess 
whether the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has changed over 
the years (i.e., whether it has moved away from Taipei 
and toward Beijing), I will use a simple heuristic device 
- a scoring model - to measure the direction and 
extent of change. There are several operational assump-
tions about this model. 
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Table 1. Model 1 - The Cold War Paradigm 
U.S. Taiwan PRC 
Views on government/ government/ government/ 
various issues executive ruling party T ruling party c 
KMT (domi- CCP (one-party 
nant-party sys- dictatorship) 
tern) 
How many One One 10 One -10 
Chinas? 
Is Taiwan a Ambiguous Yes 0 Yes 0 
part of China? (Truman: "Tai-
wan's future 
status to be 
decided") 
Where is Taipei Taipei 10 Peking -10 
China's capital? 
View of the Recognizes it as The legal gov- 10 Rebel group -10 
governing the legal gov- ernment of all ("The Chiang 
authority on ernment of all China clique"); ROC 
Taiwan China has ceased to 
exist 
View of the Does not recog- Rebel group 8 The legal gov- -8 
governing nize it ("Communist ernment of all 
authority on bandits") China 
the mainland 
What are They are ethnic They are ethnic 0 They are ethnic 0 
Taiwanese eth- Chinese Chinese Chinese 
rtically speak-
ing? 
Nature & solu- Taiwan's unde- Internal affairs: 0 Internal affairs: 0 
tion to the Tai- cided legal sta- military recov- military con-
wan question tus (to be ery ("glorious quest ("bloody 
peacefully recovery of the liberation of 
resolved?) mainland") Taiwan") 
U.S. arms sales Yes (mutual 10 No (adversary) -10 
defense treaty) 
Total score T1 = 48 C1= -48 
First, I admit that the U.S. could and did have its own 
positions regarding those issues contested between China 
and Taiwan (e.g., sovereignty, recognition, territorial 
integrity, and arms sales) that did not correspond with 
either Taipei's or Beijing's. But since Beijing and Taipei 
had insisted upon their (exclusive) legitimacy (and Bei-
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jing still does), I will simply measure "U.S. policy" in 
terms of its distance from either Beijing's or Taipei's 
positions. 
Second, for most of the time under my analysis, 
Taipei's positions and Beijing's were virtually the mirror 
image of each other. These two characteristics together 
helped define China-Taiwan relations as akin to a zero-
sum game.29 Since both vied for U.S. recognition and 
support, one's gain could not be obtained without the 
other's loss - this is a hallmark of zero-sum games. 
Third, this model incorporates the strategic interactions 
between Beijing and Taipei. 
For the sake of simplicity, this model employs a scale 
of 0 to 10. A party will get a score of 10 for an item 
(issue), if it can get the U.S. to agree with its position on 
that item completely. By definition, the other party will 
receive -10 for this item. If the U.S.'s position is neutral 
or non-committal on an item, a score of 0 is assigned. 
Scores between 10 and 0 indicate the declining conver-
gence between the U.S. position and the party's position. 
Scores between minus 10 and 0 indicate the declining 
divergence between the U.S. position and the party's 
position. If we designate T as Taiwan's score (called pay-
off) - essentially how closely the U.S. position on a 
given issue is similar to Taiwan's - and C for China's 
payoff, then for each row (a given issue), the sum of T 
and C must equal zero (T + C = 0). 
Finally, a composite score is obtained by performing a 
simple addition of all the scores from each row (issue). 
For example, T1 and C1 indicate the level of U.S. support 
for Taiwan and China, respectively, during Period 1. The 
29 In game-theoretical language, "A noncooperative game is zero sum, if 
the playoffs across all players sum to zero for every strategy n-tuple." Peter C. 
Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 144. Here we are concerned with two players 
(PRC and ROC), each with more than one strategy (e.g., cooperation, defection). 
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higher this composite score, the more U.S. support - for 
a given period. 
We further assume that the payoffs for each period 
are "normalized" - that is to say that 10 means "total 
agreement" in each period, thus allowing inter-temporal 
comparisons. This way by tracking the increase or 
decrease of either party's (Taiwan's or China) composite 
scores over different periods, we can trace the direction 
of change in U.S. policy and its magnitude. For example, 
if T2 <Ti, it means that U.S. support for Taiwan declined 
from Period 1 to Period 2. 
One caveat is necessary. Assigning these payoffs 
inevitably involves subjective evaluations. But this 
model is developed to facilitate our analysis of a complex 
foreign policy problem. If it sheds more light than 
impressionistic or journalistic statements or personal 
opinions, then it has some theoretical value. Rather than 
saying that U.S. policy has changed, and not for the bet-
ter, it is more interesting to demonstrate to what direction 
has it changed, and by how much. As long as the assump-
tions are plausible and the deductive process is sound, 
the model can be accepted as a proper analytic tool. 
With this model, I will now reconceptualize the evolu-
tion of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. I begin 
with the period before the signing of the Shanghai 
Communique. 
The Cold War Era (1949-72) 
To simplify history in a somewhat stylized fashion, the 
U.S. was "forced" to adhere to a "one China" policy from 
day one, because both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-
shek maintained that there was only one China and that 
his government was the sole legal government of China 
(i.e., the mirror image). Bitter from the experience of 
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"loss of China" in the late 1940s and the direct military 
conflicts against the newly established Chinese commu-
nist regime during the Korean War in the early 1950s, the 
U.S. decided to isolate Beijing and support Chiang Kai-
shek's positions on various issues, by denying Beijing 
international legitimacy.30 
We can assign 10 to Taipei on each of the following 
issues: "How many Chinas?," "Where is China's capi-
tal?," and "view of the government in Taipei." The U.S. 
officially recognized only one China - the ROC, and 
recognized the government in Taipei as the legal govern-
ment of all China but refused to recognize Beijing. Even 
though the U.S. did not recognize the PRC, the two nev-
ertheless held ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva and 
Warsaw. This channel of contact warrants a score of -8, 
rather than -10, for the PRC. Also, the U.S. stationed 
troops, provided military assistance, and sold weapons to 
Taiwan under the 1954 mutual defense treaty. Mean-
while, the U.S. treated the PRC as a military adversary, 
to which the U.S. did not sell arms. 10 for T and -10 for 
c. 
30 Some argue that Taiwan can only blame itself for its current diplomatic 
isolation (due to its insistence that there was only one China, of which Taiwan 
was a part). However, as John W. Garver points out, during the Cold War, the 
U.S. used Taiwan's official position to pursue the U.S.'s own strategy of isolating 
China, and Taiwan provided useful contributions to the U.S. See The Sino-
American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). Hence, the U.S. bears an equal, if not larger, 
share of responsibility for Taiwan's current diplomatic limbo. The U.S. created 
one myth during the Cold War (one China that included Taiwan, with capital in 
Taipei), and created another myth after 1972 (one China that included Taiwan, 
with capital in Beijing). Further, Taipei in recent years no longer claimed that 
there was one China and that it was the legal government of all China, but 
Beijing still did not loosen its diplomatic stranglehold on Taipei. This proves that 
Taipei's diplomatic isolation had less to do with Taiwan's own "stubbornness" on 
certain positions than to do with great powers' changing needs (and Beijing's 
stubbornness). 
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Perhaps the most interesting issue was U.S. position 
on whether Taiwan was a part of China. After North 
Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950, President 
Harry Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent the 
Communist attack on Taiwan. But he also declared, 
"The determination of the future status of Formosa (Tai-
wan) must await the restoration of the security in the 
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration 
by the United Nations."31 
The United Nations (U.N.) never did consider the 
question of Taiwan's legal status. The 1951 Japanese 
Peace Treaty merely renounced Japanese "right, title, and 
claim" to Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, 
but did not specify to whom the title was transferred. 
Nor did the 1952 ROC-Japan Peace Treaty explicitly pro-
vided for the return of Taiwan to China. 32 
So a peculiar legal "reality" existed: That is, even 
though the U.S. at that time recognized Taipei as the 
legal government of China, it was silent on the issue of 
whether Taiwan was a part of China. As a veteran diplo-
mat put it, "The last time the US made a statement about 
Taiwan's status was the Truman Administration, and that 
was that Taiwan's future status was undecided"33 - that 
is, arguably until Clinton's "three noes" statement. 
Because Truman's position on Taiwan was a neutral one, 
I assign a 0 to T, and hence 0 to C. 
Adding up these payoffs, we obtain a composite score 
of 48 for the ROC and -48 for the PRC, indicating strong 
U.S. support for the ROC. 
31 U.S. Department of State Bulletin (3 July 1950): 5. See Ralph Clough, 
Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 8-9. 
32 These documents are reproduced in Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and the 
Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973). 
33 Harvey Feldman, personal interview, Washington, DC, 9 July 1997. 
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The Shanghai Communique (1972-78) 
Motivated mainly by a strategy to court the PRC as 
an anti-Soviet counterweight by exploiting the split 
between Beijing and Moscow, President Nixon visited 
China in 1972 and signed the historic Shanghai Commu-
nique. His trip caused a major realignment in Cold War 
geopolitics. 
The carefully drafted communique provided a frame-
work for U.S. China policy (toward the PRC and Taiwan) 
for the next quarter century. So durable was this frame-
work that it attained a status of a policy paradigm, 
resisting change.34 In hindsight, it helped pave way for 
the eventual normalization of relations between Wash-
ington and Beijing by allowing them to "agree to disa-
gree." But it also presaged the steady erosion of U.S. 
support of Taiwan and the increasing U.S. acceptance of 
Beijing's position. 
The viewpoints of the three parties established by the 
Shanghai Communique are summarized in Table 2, which 
I shall call it a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. 
The most important sentence of the communique is 
the famous brilliant "diplomatic lie": 
The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintains there is but one China and that Tai-
wan is a part of China. The United States Government 
does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves (emphases added).35 
34 On the resilience of paradigms and the manner paradigms shift, see 
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
35 For the text of the communique, see Harry Harding, A Fragile 
Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 1992), Appendix B. The texts of the 1978 and 1982 communiques are 
also collected in the appendix of this book. 
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Table 2. Model 2 - The Shanghai 
Communique Paradigm 
U.S. Taiwan PRC 
Views on government/ government/ government/ 
various issues executive ruling party T ruling party 
KMT (domi- CCP (one-party 
nant-party sys- dictatorship) 
tern) 
How many Ambiguous One 0 One 
Chinas? ("The U.S. 
acknowledges 
... ") 
Is Taiwan a Ambiguous Yes 0 Yes ("a prov-
part of China? (see above) ince ... ") 
Where is Technically still Taipei 2 Peking 
China's capital? in Taipei, but 
on the way to 
Peking 
View of the On the process The legal gov- -8 Renegade 
governing of derecogni- ernment of all 
authority on ti on China 
Taiwan 
View of the On the process Rebel group -2 The sole legal 
governing of recognition/ ("Communist government of 
authority on normalization bandits") all China 
the mainland 
What are They are Chi- They are 0 They are 
Taiwanese eth- nese ("Chinese Chinese Chinese 
nically speak- on either side 
ing? of the ... 
Strait") 
Nature & solu- A Chinese mat- Internal affairs: -5 China's internal 
tion to the Tai- ter ("peaceful from military affair - no 
wan question settlement by reunification to other country 
themselves") political reunifi- can interfere 
with implica- cation Still military 
tions for Asia approach 
and US 
U.S. arms sales Tapering off 2 No 











The key word is acknowledge, which in diplomatic 
parlance means "take cognizance of" or "do not chal-
lenge but do not necessarily accept or endorse, either." 
It arguably allowed the U.S. and the PRC to normalize 
271 
their relations, retained U.S. interests in a peaceful settle-
ment of Taiwan's status, and preserved Taiwan people's 
right to self-determination. 
Harvey Feldman argues that 
The U.S. position was an easy call for President Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger to make in 1972, because this position was 
also that of the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang 
Kai-shek, who dreamed of using the island as a base for 
recapturing the Chinese mainland. Of course, it was not 
the position of the ethnic Taiwanese, who made up about 90 
percent of the island's population and were living there 
before Chiang and his nationalist troops arrived. . . . But 
their view did not matter because Taiwan was then an 
authoritarian state.36 
But what exactly is the meaning of "China"? Scholar 
John Copper argues that "the United States up to now 
had defined China as a historical or cultural concept. 
Thus America's one-China policy did not refer to a Chi-
nese State or government and therefore did not deny the 
legitimacy of the Republic of China on Taiwan."37 
Continuing his line on "Taiwan's undecided status," 
Feldman argues that "although we acknowledged that 
Beijing says that Taiwan is a part of China, we made and 
continue to make absolutely no formal statement of our 
own about Taiwan's status."38 
Because the U.S. positions on the number of (polit-
ical) Chinas and whether Taiwan is part of China, as 
defined in the Shanghai Communique, were ambiguous, I 
assign a payoff of (0, 0) on the first question (the first 
36 Harvey Feldman, "In Clinton's China Shuffle, Taiwan Loses," The 
Washington Post (19 July 1998): Cl. 
37 John F. Copper, "China's Three Nos," commentary for Taiwan Research 
Institute, 2 July 1998, available at http:/!www.taiwaninformation.org/viewlusl 
copper070298.html. 
38 Harvey Feldman, "What Does 'One China' Mean?" commentary for 
Taiwan Research Institute, 29 June 1998, available at http:// 
www.taiwaninformation.org/view/us!feldman062998.html. 
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number is T's payoff, the second, C's) and also a (0, 0) on 
the second question. The first two tables show an erosion 
of Taipei's position, and hence an improvement of Bei-
jing's position. 
Even though the U.S. still had diplomatic relationship 
with Taipei, it was preparing for the transfer of diplo-
matic recognition to Beijing. In fact, the U.S. started a 
"liaison office" in Beijing in 1974, with George Bush as 
the first envoy. This must also be seen as erosion of 
Taipei's legitimacy. I assign a -8 to Taiwan for the rapidly 
disappearing diplomatic relatio11ship, a -2 to Taiwan for 
the remaining days of U.S. keeping an embassy in Taipei, 
and a 2 to the PRC for its all-but-name diplomatic status 
accorded by the U.S. 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, though still on-going, were 
tapering off. Indeed, one of the "three conditions" China 
demanded in return for normalization with the U.S. was 
withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan. 
Finally, although the U.S. asserted an interest in the 
peaceful settlement of Taiwan's status, it also basically 
ceded that the solution was mainly a Chinese matter. 
Although it stopped short of the Chinese position, which 
did not preclude force, it made no attempt to ensure that 
political negotiations between Taipei and Beijing would 
be more or less equitable. And because American policy 
caused Taiwan to negotiate a political settlement with 
Beijing from a very disadvantaged position, this must be 
seen as an erosion of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. I 
assign -5 to Taiwan, and 5 to China. 
Conceptually, one can argue that the closer the two's 
composite scores, the more likely the "peaceful settle-
ment" will be more equitable. In fact, one can even 
argue that given the enormous size disparity between the 
two sides, a score for Taiwan that is slightly higher than 
China's (i.e., empowering Taiwan) entails a better chance 
for achieving an equitable peaceful solution, rather than 
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"peaceful surrender" by Taiwan or "peaceful annexa-
tion" by China. 
Not surprisingly, the composite score for Taiwan dur-
ing this period dropped 59 points to -11, and China's rose 
59 points to 11. This big swing of fortune was confirmed 
in real life: The ROC was essentially expelled from the 
United Nations in 1971 after Nixon announced his trip to 
China, and numerous states quickly derecognized Taiwan 
in favor of Beijing. 
The 1978 Normalization Communique and the 
August 17, 1982 Communique 
The other two communiques signed between the U.S. 
and the PRC - the 1978 normalization communique and 
the 1982 communique on arms sales to Taiwan - defined 
a third model, as shown in Table 3. 
By the time Jimmy Carter switched diplomatic rela-
tions from Taipei to Beijing in January 1979, democracy 
was already an emerging force on Taiwan. The phrase, 
"all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait," became 
no longer valid, because the majority of the people on 
Taiwan would dispute it. 
So in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and the PRC, the 
U.S. simply replaced that sentence with "The Govern-
ment of the United States of American acknowledges the 
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan 
is part of China (emphases added). "39 
Although one can argue that the U.S. still maintained 
a position of "acknowledging," rather than "recogniz-
ing," which would imply acceptance of PRC sovereignty 
over Taiwan, the change was, though subtle, nevertheless 
profound. The U.S. still "does not challenge," but moves 
39 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 380. 
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Table 3. Model 3 - The 1979 and 1982 
Communiques Paradigm 
Views on U.S. Taiwan PRC 
various government/ Taiwan people and government/ 
issues executive government oppositions T rnling party 
KMT-pre- DPP CCP (one-
sided demo- party dicta-
cratization torship) 
How many Less ambig- One One China; -5 One 





Is Taiwan a Less ambig- Yes No -2 Yes ("a 
part of uous (see province 
China? above) ... ") 
Where is Beijing Taipei Beijing; -10 Beijing 
China's cap- Taiwan's in 
ital? Taipei 
View of the Derecog- The legal The legal -8 Renegade 
governing nized; main- government government 
authority on tain unoffi- of all China of Taiwan 
Taiwan cial ties 
View of the The sole Technically Govern- -10 The sole 
governing legal gov- still a rebel ment of legal gov-
authority on ernment of group another emment of 
the main- China state all China 
land 
What are Can't claim They are They are 1 They are 
Taiwanese that all Chi- Chinese Taiwanese Chinese 
ethnically nese on 
speaking? either side 
... 
Nature & A Chinese Internal Self-deter- -7 "China's 
solution to matter affairs: mination by internal 
the Taiwan ("peaceful maintaining the 21 mil- affair - but 
question settlement status quo lion Taiwan shifted to 






U.S. arms Gradually -3 Some dur-
sales reducing ing Reagan 












closer toward Beijing's position, because the U.S. no 
longer mentions Taiwan's position (whether it "acknowl-
edges" or opposes). 
However, by 1982, the Chinese were pressing for 
more definitive concessions from the U.S., specifically 
U.S. promises to reduce arms sales to Taiwan over time 
and to deprive Taiwan's sovereignty. So a third commu-
nique was signed on August 17, 1982. In addition to 
repeating the language of the normalization communi-
que, it set two precedents. 
The first precedent was that the U.S. promised to 
gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan - this was a Chi-
nese demand. The United States Government states that 
It does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms 
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, 
either in qualitative or in quantitative terms the level of 
those supplied in recent years since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and China, 
and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to 
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution 
(emphasis added).40 
Due to the vague wording of the document, the Chi-
nese insisted that the U.S. had accepted their position: 
peaceful settlement would mean reunification of Taiwan 
under Beijing's sovereignty, and the U.S. would not for-
ever arm Taiwan to hamper Beijing's reunification. 
The U.S., on the other hand, insisted that reduction of 
arms sales would be linked to China's "fundamental pol-
icy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
question." In recent years, the U.S. had employed vari-
ous methods, such as inflation adjustments, technology 
transfer, and assessment of cross-strait military balance, 
to ensure that Taiwan had adequate capabilities to 
40 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 384. 
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defend itself, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act 
(see below). 
The second precedent turned out to be the origin of 
the second of Clinton's three noes: "The United States 
Government . . . reiterates that it has no intention of 
infringing in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy 
of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan."' 
This statement had the effect of essentially agreeing 
to (or at least not contesting) Beijing's claim that its rela-
tionship with Taiwan was "internal affairs." Still Beijing 
refused to renounce force against Taiwan and committed 
itself to only peaceful means of settling its disputes with 
Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, as part of the bargain for normalization 
of relations with the U.S., China stopped shelling Taiwan-
held offshore islands, and began a peace approach toward 
reunification. This new approach began with the 
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan of 1January1979 and 
the Nine-Point Proposal of 30 September 1981, and 
culminated in Deng Xiaoping's now-famous "one coun-
try, two systems" deal. Deng's formula reportedly was 
first designed for Taiwan but was implemented first in 
Hong Kong due to the latter's transition of sovereignty in 
1997. 
The changing viewpoints of various players are sum-
marized in Table 3. Comparing this table with Table 2, 
one can see that clear distinctions between Taiwan's offi-
cial positions and those of the opposition parties began to 
develop, therefore rendering the formula developed in 
the Shanghai Communique even more problematic. In 
this regard, to the extent that the more divergent Taiwan 
people's positions were from Beijing's and yet the more 
Washington's were moving toward Beijing's, it must be 
considered Taiwan's further setback. This tilting is 
reflected in the drop of Taiwan's payoffs on the first five 
issues, and the swings are large. 
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The only thing positive was on the issue of whether 
Washington continued to insist that the people in Taiwan 
were merely Chinese. To some extent, this can be seen as 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for U.S. support 
of self-determination by the people of Taiwan. Clearly, 
as the people of Taiwan continue to enjoy de facto inde-
pendence, they are more likely to develop an identity 
that is separate from, or even antithetical to, the Chinese 
identity that was previously imposed by the mainlander-
dominated KMT government. I give 1 to Taiwan, and -1 
to China. 
The composite scores show further erosions of Tai-
wan's positions and weakening of U.S. support for Tai-
wan's. Taiwan's score dropped another 33 points from 
the earlier period, and the PRC's gained 33 points. But 
the Taiwan Relations Act established another model. 
The Taiwan Relations Act (1979) and the Taiwan policy 
Review (1994) 
Since 1979, U.S. China policy has operated under an 
unusual, and often uneasy, dual-track framework: U.S. 
relations with the PRC were handled diplomatically, 
whereas U.S. relations with Taiwan were handled domes-
tically. Congress reacted against President Jimmy 
Carter's failure to consult with Congress before establish-
ing diplomatic relations with the PRC and his poor treat-
ment of Taiwan by enacting The Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA).41 
41 U.S. Public Law 96-8, 96'h Congress, 10 April 1979. The text of the Act 
can be found in Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, eds., Legislative History of 
the Taiwan Relations Act: An Analytic Compilation with Documents on 
Subsequent Developments (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese 
Studies, 1982), 288-95. 
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The TRA was a legislative innovation. As Stephen 
Solarz, the influential former Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, pointed out, "The TRA was enacted to 
solve an unprecedented diplomatic problem: how to con-
tinue U.S. substantive relations with the people on Tai-
wan even though the U.S. government terminated 
diplomatic relations with the government in Taipei, as a 
precondition for normalization of relations with 
Beijing. "42 
Consider the conventional wisdom in international 
law. The noted jurist Gerhard von Glahn argues that 
nonrecognition of an existing state is both a strange con-
cept and an ineffectual political measure.43 Take Taiwan 
for example. Von Glahn argues that "from a factual 
point of view, the Republic of China continued to exist as 
an independent entity, even though it is recognized by 
only 23 (sic) members of the family of nations." In the-
ory, Article 3 of the 1933 Monevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of the States enunciates: "The political 
existence of the state is independent of recognition by the 
other states." Article 6 states that "recognition is uncon-
ditional and irrevocable." However, in practice, states' 
decisions to grant or withdraw recognition are based on 
their own political judgment on whether an entity merits 
recognition as a state. 
As a general practice, an unrecognized state cannot 
have access to the courts of the state refusing recognition, 
but on the other hand, it is also immune from suit in 
those same courts. Legitimate interests of one's citizens 
42 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittees on Human 
Rights and International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, Hearing and Markup, 7 May, 25 
June, and 1 August 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1987), 1. 
43 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law, 7th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), 82, 63. 
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cannot be protected adequately in the unrecognized 
state. 
But the TRA created an exception to this general 
rule. Von Glahn argues that the TRA caused the United 
States to treat Taiwan as a state and its governing author-
ities as a government, despite the formal derecognition of 
both by the United States.44 The TRA provided: 
Sec. 4(a) ... 
The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not 
affect the application of the laws of the United States to 
Taiwan as they applied prior to January 1, 1979 ... 
Sec. 4(b) ... 
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate 
to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or 
similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws 
shall apply with respect to Taiwan. 
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in the courts 
of the United States, in accordance with the laws of the 
United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modi-
fied, denied, or otherwise affected in anyway by the 
absence of diplomatic relations or recognition. 
Sec. 4(d) 
Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for support-
ing the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued 
membership in any international financial institution or any 
other international organization. 
Therefore, judging from the letter of these provisions, 
it appears that in theory the TRA provided a framework 
for the U.S. to develop unofficial relations with Taiwan 
and to treat the latter as a de facto state. However, in 
practice, Taiwan was expelled from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1980 at China's 
insistence. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan's political system quickly democ-
ratized. One notable development was the end in 1991 of 
the Period of Mobilization and Suppression of Rebellion, 
44 Law Among Nations, 85. 
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thereby formalizing the end of hostility toward the main-
land and treating Beijing as a political entity that effec-
tively exercised jurisdiction on the mainland. In other 
words, Taipei no longer claimed to be the legal govern-
ment of all China; it only claimed the areas under its con-
trol. Instead, it championed "one country, two 
government" or "one (divided) China." 
Pragmatism was also exhibited in President Lee Teng-
hui's "pragmatic diplomacy." The people in Taiwan 
demanded more international recognition. The govern-
ment and the main opposition party, Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP), seized the initiative of a popular 
cause, pushing for a seat in the U.N. every year since 
1993. This generated much sympathy in U.S. Congress, 
which put forth several congressional hearings and reso-
lutions to support Taiwan's participation in the U.N.45 
After the Republican victory in both houses of the 
Congress in 1994, the Clinton Administration made mod-
est adjustments to upgrade relations with Taiwan. The 
resultant Taiwan Policy Review did not go as far as many 
had hoped. But it did permit Taiwan to change the name 
of its representative office to Taipei Economic and Cul-
tural Representative Office (TECRO) from the old indis-
tinct Coordination Council for North American Affairs 
(CCNAA), allow more direct contact between U.S. and 
Taiwan officials, and avow U.S. support of Taiwan's 
membership in suitable international organizations (such 
as World Trade Organization, WTO, where membership 
would not require statehood).46 
45 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, H. Con. Res. 
132, Relating to the Republic of China's Participation in the United Nations (29 
June 1997), H. Con. Res. 63, Relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan's) 
Participation in the United Nations (3 August 1995), and Should Taiwan be 
Admitted to the United Nations?, Joint Hearing (14 July 1994). 
46 John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's 
Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 40-41. 
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Meanwhile, U.S. public support for China plummeted 
after the Chinese government's bloody crackdown of 
pro-democracy students in Tiananmen in 1989. China 
began to clash with the U.S. on a wide array of issues, 
including human rights, trade deficits, and weapons 
proliferation. Certain members in Congress wanted to 
punish China by rewarding Taiwan. 
Moreover, China undertook a massive program of 
military modernization. China's acquisitions of advanced 
fighters, such as the Su-27, naval vessels, and ballistic 
missile technology worried China's neighbors in Asia, 
threatening to upset the delicate regional balance of 
power. Military strategists thus sought to increase the 
quantity and quality of arms sales to Taiwan. In addition, 
Section 2 of the TRA had already provided strong (but 
not automatic) U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.47 
All these developments combined seemed to elevate 
Taiwan's status and increase U.S.'s support somewhat. 
The results are summarized in Table 4. 
Taiwan's composite score increased by 15 points, and 
China's declined by 15. This was the first countertrend 
against the steady decline of Taiwan's score since 1972 
(see Tables 1-4). 
Understanding the nature of China-Taiwan rivalry,48 
47 For example, Sec. 2(b) states that it is the policy of the United States ... 
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political security, and 
economic interest of the United States, and are matters of international concern; 
... (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and the grave concern to the United States 
... (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force 
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic systems, of the people of Taiwan. Sec. 3(a) ... The United States will 
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such 
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability. 
48 China-Taiwan rivalry embodies elements of the spite game. In this 
asymmetrical game, the party with the stronger bargaining position may care 
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Table 4. Model 4 - The Taiwan Relations Act and the 
Taiwan Policy Review Paradigm 
Views on U.S. Taiwan PRC 
various government/ Taiwan people and government/ 
issues executive government oppositions T ruling party c 
Multi-party DPP, NP CCP (one-
democracy party dicta-
torship) 
How many De facto One divided One China; -2 One 2 
Chinas? one China, China; one One Taiwan 
one Taiwan China, two 
govern-
men ts 
Is Taiwan a Not part of Separate No -1 Yes (rene- 1 
part of the PRC jurisdictions gade prov-
China? ince) 
Where is Beijing Taipei= Beijing; -8 Beijing 8 
China's cap- ROC= Taiwan's in 
ital? China Taipei 
View of the Maintain Legal gov- Legal gov- -6 Renegade 6 
governing unofficial ernment of ernment of 
authority on but strong territories Taiwan 
Taiwan ties ruled by 
ROC 
View of the The sole Govern- Govern- -7 The sole 7 
governing legal gov- ment of ment of legal gov-
authority on ernment of mainland another ernment of 
the main- China state all China 
land 
What are Rising They are They are 1 They are -1 
Taiwanese Taiwanese Chinese and Taiwanese Chinese 
ethnically identity Taiwanese 
speaking? 
Nature & A Chinese Internal Self-deter- -6 "China's 6 
solution to matter affairs: mination by internal 
the Taiwan ("peaceful maintaining the 21 mil- affair -
question settlement status quo, lion Taiwan pressuring 
by them- internation- people "Hong 
selves") alize Taiwan Kong 




U.S. arms Contingent 0 Increasing 0 
sales upon secur- military 
ity in the cooperation 
Strait? 
Total score T4 = -29 C4 = 29 
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we can argue that improvement in Taiwan's payoffs, with 
or without improvement in China's payoffs, is likely to 
draw China to try to stop that trend, that is, to pressure 
the U.S. for concessions over Taiwan. This was indeed a 
game-theoretical clue to what was lying ahead - maneu-
vers to obtain Clinton's "three noes" remarks, which fur-
ther augmented Beijing's bargaining power vis-a-vis 
Taiwan's. 
From Military Showdown to "Three Noes" 
After the U.S. allowed Taiwan President Lee Teng-
hui to visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995, 
China reacted furiously by launching several rounds of 
provocative military exercises aimed at what Chinese 
hard-liners called "separatists" and at intimidating Tai-
wan's voters. The missile tests in March 1996 before Tai-
wan's first direct presidential elections effectively closed 
off Taiwan's two major international ports. China's 
saber-rattling arguably "triggered" Sec. 2( 4) of the TRA, 
becoming the first real test of U.S. commitment toward 
Taiwan, as mandated by the TRA. 
The Clinton Administration managed to diffuse the 
immediate military crisis by dispatching two aircraft car-
rier battle groups - the largest assembly of naval power 
in the Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War - to 
waters off Taiwan. President Lee won the election by a 
landslide. China's coercive diplomacy backfired. 
The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was a turning point and 
a rude awakening for Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. A 
more about relative gain margins over its rival than about larger absolute gains 
for both itself and its rival (i.e., difference-maximizer). Given the asymmetrical 
position favoring it, China has often sought to maximize its relative gain margin 
over Taiwan. For a formal presentation and explanation of the game of spite, see 
Henry Hamburger, Games as Models of Social Phenomena (San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman, 1979): 84-88. 
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peculiar logic, which blamed the victims, evolved into a 
"mainstream" view. Some formal or informal advisors to 
the Clinton Administration concluded that Taiwan's 
"creeping independence" was the main cause of the crisis 
and Lee's Cornell visit was the immediate catalyst that 
almost dragged the U.S. into a potential war with China. 
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., a former Pentagon official, 
accused Taipei for "provocatively moving toward inde-
pendence," and thus "must be reined in."49 Joseph S. 
Nye, a Harvard scholar and a former senior Pentagon 
official, proposed a "three-part deal" for Taiwan: (1) The 
U.S. would work to discourage other countries from rec-
ognizing Taiwan independence. At the same time, the 
U.S. would not accept the use of force, since nothing 
would change as the result of any abortive declaration of 
independence by Taiwan. (2) Beijing would not oppose 
the idea of more international living space for Taiwan 
and its "one-country, two-systems" approach to Hong 
Kong could be broadened to "one-country, three-sys-
tems." (3) Taipei should explicitly express its decision to 
forswear any steps toward independence.50 These ideas 
provided an intellectual foundation for Clinton's "three 
noes." 
Clinton, after winning reelection, sought to put U.S.-
China relations back on track, rather than let it drift, as in 
his first term. He decided to seek a "strategic partner-
ship" with China. Jiang Zemin paid a summit visit to the 
U.S. in October-November 1997. Clinton returned the 
visit in June-July 1998. 
49 Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., "Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait," Foreign 
Affairs 77(4) (July-August 1998): 6-11. 
so Joseph S. Nye, "A Taiwan Deal," The Washington Post (8 March 1998): 
C7. Consider how similar Nye's ideas are to Clinton's "three noes." He even 
preempted the critics in his article, "Critics might reject this proposal as amoral, 
since it ignores Taiwan's alleged right to 'self-determination."' 
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It was after the joint press conference of Jiang and 
Clinton in October 1997 that certain Clinton Administra-
tion officials began to float verbal versions of the "three 
noes." Before the 1998 summit, the Chinese sought to 
commit the Americans to this verbal policy of "three 
noes" in writing - in the form of a fourth communique. 
But the Clinton Administration refused, because past 
experience showed that the more written documents with 
the Chinese, the less leeway the U.S. had and the more 
promises the Chinese would seek from the U.S. 
But does the "three noes" statement indicate a 
change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan? Does it harm Tai-
wan? What impact does it have on Taiwan's future? 
These are important questions not only for academic and 
policy debates, but also for the livelihood of the 22 mil-
lion hardworking people on Taiwan and the prospects for 
peace or war in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific. 
With the aid of my model, we can attempt to approach 
some of the answers to these complex questions. 
4. Analyzing the "Three Noes" 
Let's recount President Clinton's remarks. 
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that 
we don't support independence for Taiwan, or "two China" 
or "one China, one Taiwan." And we don't believe that 
Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which 
statehood is a requirement. 
Clinton's choice of word was deliberate: "I had a 
chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy." This indicates 
that he had said the same (or similar) thing before, and 
the Q&A answer was not the first time he said it. When, 
to whom, and where did he say it before are important 
issues that he deliberately left out in the remarks. Pre-
sumably he first concurred in the private meetings with 
286 
Jiang Zemin, when the latter visited the U.S. in 1997, and 
he would simply say it one more time while in China to 
please the host, Jiang. 
The "three noes" were demands that the Chinese gov-
ernment repeatedly put forward after the 1996 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, which, over time, appeared to be "internal-
ized" or accepted by American officials. However, hear-
ing it publicly from a U.S. president for the first time was 
viewed by the PRC side as a new commitment by the 
U.S. Beijing hence now routinely cites it along the three 
U.S.-China joint communiques to "remind" the Ameri-
cans. The fact that the PRC side wants to "lock in" their 
gain must be considered concessions made (or perceived 
by the Chinese to have been made) by the U.S. side, 
which, according to the logic of our model, means set-
back for Taiwan. Bill Clinton, indeed, became the first 
U.S. president to publicly address the "three noes," as 
many analysts justifiably criticized. 
Robert Manning, a former State Department official, 
chided Clinton's using an offbeat "three noes" comment 
to pay back the Chinese side: "The apparent payoff for 
Clinton's media access was an unfortunate and unneces-
sary statement on Taiwan [kowtow No. 3] that infuriated 
Taipei, outraged Congress and likely will prove counter-
productive to U.S. interests."51 
It should be clear by now that publicly stating the 
"three noes" by the president was new. Now I will 
examine the substance of the "three noes." 
The "three noes" raised four issues for Taiwan: (1) 
Taiwan's right to self-determination, (2) Taiwan's sover-
eignty, (3) Taiwan's international status, and ( 4) Taiwan's 
choice in its political relationship with the mainland. I 
will address each in turn. 
51 Robert Manning, "Clinton in China: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," 
lntellectua!Capital.com (9 July 1998), from http://www.lntellectualCapital.com/ 
issues/98/0709/icworld2.asp. 
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Precluding Taiwan's Right to Self-Determination 
The issue of self-determination has been heatedly 
debated between idealists and realists. In theory, self-
determination is an "elemental right" of people to decide 
their legitimate ruler and has been established as an 
essential democratic principle. As E. H. Carr stated, 
"Self-determination might indeed be regarded as implicit 
in the idea of democracy."52 Woodrow Wilson, the main 
proponent of national self-determination and architect of 
the League of Nations, said, "No peace can last, or ought 
to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle 
that governments derive all their just powers from the 
consent of the governed and that no right anywhere 
exists, to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sover-
eignty as if they were property."53 
Taiwan is now a democracy. Its leaders are duly 
elected by its people. It is unlike Hong Kong, a colony 
whose people were handed from one ruler to the next. 
Opinion polls consistently show that the majority favors 
the status quo for now and a decision in the future. In 
this respect, based on democratic principles, the U.S. 
should support Taiwan people's right to self-
determination. 
In fact, the deliberate ambiguity in American policy 
regarding Taiwan's status during the periods under our 
study can be seen as attempts to avoid prejudicing Tai-
wan people claiming this right. As Harvey Feldman says, 
52 E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1942), 39. 
53 "Peace Without Victory," Address of President Wilson to the United 
States Senate, 22 January 1917 (U.S. 64th Congress, 2nd Sess., Sen. Document 
685) in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 7th ed. 
(New York: Appleton-Century Crofts), 126. The quotes from Carr and Wilson 
can be found in Lawrence T. Farley, Plebiscite and Sovereignty: The Crisis of 
Political Illegitimacy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 4-5. 
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Still, Washington remained silent on whether Taiwan was or 
was not a part of China. By refusing to state an American 
view, other than to say it was a matter to be decided by the 
parties themselves by peaceful means acceptable to both 
sides, the United States left the ultimate decision on Tai-
wan's status where it should be - with the people of 
Taiwan.s4 
However, practices of international politics have devi-
ated greatly from these democratic principles. Two schol-
ars conclude that during the Cold War the United States 
resisted noncolonial self-determination claims on the 
basis of five principles: 
• Determine support for a self-determination movement 
by assessing its potential impact on the worldwide 
struggle with the Soviet Union. 
• Avoid actions that risk a military confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. 
• Preserve the existing state. 
• Resist changes in the international boundaries estab-
lished after World War IL 
• Gauge the domestic political response. ss 
During the Cold War period, the rest of the interna-
tional community was as reluctant as the U.S. to support 
secessionist demands. Indeed, prior to its recognition of 
the states emerging from the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and of Yugoslavia, the international community 
had accepted only one full-fledged secessionist claim 
since 1945: that of Bangladesh in 1971.s6 The authors, 
however, point out that the old approach for dealing with 
self-determination after the Cold War proved 
inadequate. 
54 Feldman, "In Clinton's China Shuttle." 
55 Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, with Patricia L. Small, Self-
determination in the New World Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1992), 11-12. 
56 Halperin and Scheffer, Self-determination, 13. 
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Even though the U.S. in principle endorses self-deter-
mination, in practice it has found it very "inconvenient." 
This in itself, however, does not mean that the U.S. will 
not or should not support any future cases. But by saying 
that the U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan, 
or "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan,'' Bill Clin-
ton has virtually precluded even the possibility of Ameri-
can support of Taiwanese self-determination. This may 
be in the U.S. interests now, but may not be so in the 
future with different circumstances. 
Furthermore, does the U.S. have the right or power to 
tell Taiwan voters what they can or cannot do? The U.S. 
may have the capacity to refuse to confer legitimacy on 
Taiwan's self-determination claim. But even that seems 
to contradict America's values. 
Does China have the right to prohibit Taiwan people 
from selecting that course? No. Because today almost 
all landmass on earth is occupied by some states, the cre-
ation of a new state can only come at the expense of an 
existing state's territory. This is where the principles of 
self-determination and territorial integrity clash. It is 
thus understandable why most major powers are reluc-
tant to actively support secessionist claims. 
However, if Taiwan should decide to declare de jure 
independence, does it come at the expense of PRC terri-
tory? An important distinction must be made here: what 
is now and what may be in the future. If Taiwan is now 
indeed a part of the PRC (in Beijing's view of "one 
China"), then Taiwan's self-determination will come at 
the expense of PRC territory, and major powers will have 
to weigh such aspirations against China's territorial integ-
rity interests. This is clearly Beijing's position. Beijing 
wants the world to help it to stop Taiwan's independence. 
Beijing seeks to substitute what may be in the future (or 
what it desires to be, or what it thinks ought to be) for 
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what is now, and forces the international community to 
accept its fantasy. 
The current reality is that Taiwan is not and has never 
been a part of the PRC, and has been separate from the 
PRC for 50 years. In fact, the PRC has never ruled Tai-
wan for a single day. Thus, Taiwan's independence can 
not and will not come at the expense of PRC territory. 
The PRC has often accused, and more and more 
American officials echoed, that Taiwan is changing the 
status quo. What is the status quo? Beijing says that the 
status quo is one unified China, with capital in Beijing. 
Therefore, independence by Taiwan is illegal. 
But the fact is that the status quo is two separate gov-
ernments in a divided China. The ROC has all the ele-
ments of statehood as listed in the Montevideo 
Convention, but the world community chooses not to rec-
ognize that. The PRC has used its clout (and force) to 
compel the international community to say the ROC is 
not what it is - a sovereign state. The U.S. and other 
nations become accomplices in PRC's ludicrous "world 
order," in which the world's 19th largest economy and 
fourteenth largest trader with the third largest foreign 
exchange holding is barred from the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.N. Who 
is really changing the status quo? 
As a practical matter, whether Taiwan will exercise 
the right of self-determination is a quite different ques-
tion than whether Taiwan does have that right. Taiwan 
voters and leaders will decide whether exercising this 
right is in their best interests. And if they do decide to go 
ahead, the international community, including the U.S. 
and the PRC, will then decide how to respond based on 
their own interests. 
For Clinton to deny Taiwanese people, who have 
proudly worked toward an American-style democracy, 
their democratic right of self-determination and to pre-
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elude their exercising this right is both ironic and ground-
less. This is precisely what the previous presidents from 
Nixon onward had carefully tried not to do. Clinton, in 
this regard, clearly broke new ground. 
Downgrading Taiwan's Sovereignty 
The second unfortunate effect of Clinton's "three 
noes" is to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty. In Clinton's 
scheme, if Taiwan can be neither "the Republic of China" 
("two Chinas") nor "the Republic of Taiwan" (one 
China, one Taiwan"), and cannot be separate from the 
PRC, then what is Taiwan (or, what can it be)? The PRC 
again confuses what is for what ought to be. The only 
status for Taiwan that is acceptable to the PRC is for 
Taipei to be a local government that is subordinate to 
Beijing, the central government. The more lenient ver-
sion of this unitary arrangement is "one country, two 
systems." 
But Taiwan is not a local government under the PRC, 
and will not want to become that. Clinton's "three noes" 
statement, while not quite endorsing outright Beijing's 
preferred formula for the future, it rejects Taipei's current 
reality. Recall the Shanghai Communique's carefully 
drafted formula: "the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." This is 
the diplomatic equivalent of "I heard what you guys are 
saying." At least the U.S. then managed to hear both 
sides. Clinton's statements show that the U.S. now hears 
only one side - Beijing's. 
Consider how the PRC has perfected its peculiar one-
China "syllogism" that downgrades Taiwan's sovereignty: 
(1) There is only one China. (2) Taiwan is a part of 
China. (3) Now most states recognize the PRC as the 
292 
sole legal government of China. It then follows that ( 4) 
Taiwan is a part of the PRC and Beijing is the legal gov-
ernment of Taiwan. 
If Beijing has not insisted in equating China with the 
PRC, Taiwan can probably accept (1) and (2). In other 
words, politically, Taiwan used to be a part of China (that 
China was actually the ROC!) and Taiwan aspires to be a 
part of (democratic) China in the future; and culturally, 
Taiwan is part of the Chinese culture. 
But since the PRC now says that China is the PRC, 
and that for Taiwan to be a part of China means Taiwan 
people are subjects of the PRC, Taiwan has moved away 
from either (1) or (2), or the "one China" principle. An 
increasing number of people say that they are Taiwanese, 
rather than Chinese, and that Taiwan is Taiwan and 
China is China. This is because as long as Beijing insists 
on its interpretations and the world accept Beijing's, for 
Taiwan, acceptance of (1) or (2), not to mention (3), 
would mean instant annexation of the ROC by the PRC, 
and instant imposition of an unelected dictatorship on 
Taiwan people. 
After 1991, the ROC is no longer contesting with the 
PRC for exclusive legitimacy for all of China. It does not 
challenge the PRC's jurisdiction over the mainland. But 
the PRC's battle has moved beyond challenging the 
ROC's representation of all China to the ROC's repre-
sentation of Taiwan! Virtually nobody in Taiwan consid-
ers that the PRC represent him/her. But the PRC does 
not even allow Taiwan people to say "You are not my 
ruler." And Clinton chose to ignore Taiwan people's 
v01ces. 
Clinton's remarks have moved away from the 
"acknowledging both sides" model to "hearing one side 
(Beijing), ignoring the other (Taipei)" model. Again, he 
broke new ground. 
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Increasing Taiwan's International Isolation 
Practically speaking, of the "three noes," the third no 
- no U.S. support of Taiwan's membership in interna-
tional organizations where statehood is a requirement, is 
the most injurious of Taiwan's immediate interests. Clin-
ton's statements have effectively barred Taiwan entry to 
the United Nations, and most if not all U.N. programs 
and affiliated organizations - at least not without Bei-
jing's blessing. 
The Clinton Administration cites the General Agree-
ment of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the 
WTO, as an example of a proper organization for Tai-
wan, because GATT/WTO membership is also open to 
customs territories. The Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) forum, which calls its members "econo-
mies," is another example. 
But most important intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) are related to the U.N., including those that can 
benefit from Taiwan's presence, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank.57 
Taiwan's alleged lack of statehood is a fabricated 
myth for the convenience of the major powers. Now for 
the U.S. to deny Taiwan membership in international 
organizations "where statehood is a requirement" is ludi-
crous. This "no" will further Taiwan's international isola-
tion. And the world community will pay for the price. 
Even with the few "shining examples," such as the 
WTO, U.S. support has not been strong. It is widely 
known that China has insisted, and many WTO members 
57 Hong Kong is a member of the IMF, World Bank, and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), among others, and obtained its seat in the GATI through 
British "sponsorship." This prompted some people to prescribe a Hong Kong-
style solution for Taiwan's international living space. See, for example, James C. 
Hsiung, "Hong Kong as a Nonsovereign International Actor," Asian Affairs: An 
American Review 24(4) (Winter 1998): 237-51. 
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acquiesced, that China must enter the WTO before Tai-
wan. This means that even for one international organi-
zation that Beijing says that Taipei can enter, Taiwan has 
to accept extra conditions: waiting until China has trans-
formed its socialist economy into a market-worthy one 
eligible for WTO membership, and then joining as a 
"Chinese customs territory" - a second-class citizen. 
Until recently, the U.S. did not actively support Tai-
wan's ascension to the WTO, partly to time it with 
China's. The U.S. claimed that its support alone would 
not get Taipei into the WTO before Beijing (i.e., not a 
sufficient condition). Yet without active U.S. support and 
willingness to stand up to the PRC, Taiwan will never get 
into any IGO (i.e., a necessary condition). 
From Peaceful Settlement to Peaceful Reunification 
Finally, Bill Clinton during his trip also became the 
first American President to use the phrase "reunifica-
tion" to describe the kind of political settlement between 
Beijing and Taipei that the U.S. had all along insisted 
must be peaceful. Although the PRC has always used the 
phrase peaceful reunification, the U.S. has always used 
peaceful settlement or peaceful resolution in all official 
documents and public statements. 
In other words, the U.S. has always insisted on a 
peaceful process of resolving the political differences 
between Beijing and Taipei by themselves. But the PRC 
has always insisted upon a particular outcome, which can 
be reached peacefully, namely reunification (more pre-
cisely, a "one country, two systems" type of union under 
Beijing's sovereignty), and rejected any other outcomes 
that can also be peacefully reached, such as separation. 
Meanwhile, Beijing has never ruled out that this non-
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negotiable outcome - reunification - can also be 
reached not peacefully - through force. 
One cannot explain Bill Clinton's use of the term 
reunification by slippage in words. It signals a not-so-
subtle and important shift of U.S. policy: The U.S. now 
agrees that "peaceful resolution" means peaceful reunifi-
cation under Beijing's leadership. So the issue now is on 
the terms of reunification, namely how generous the deal 
Beijing is willing to present to Taiwan, not whether Tai-
wan and the mainland should be together at all. This has 
the practical effect of narrowing Taiwan people's list of 
choices for their political future and undermining Taiwan 
government's bargaining power. Again, Bill Clinton 
broke new ground. 
Clinton Administration officials scrambled to assure 
Congress and Taiwan that U.S. policy toward Taiwan had 
not changed. In this respect, it is instructive to review the 
"six guarantees" that Ronald Reagan issued through cer-
tain channels to Taiwan before the signing of the August 
17, 1982 communique that set limits on U.S. arm sales to 
Taiwan: The U.S. side 
1. Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to 
Taiwan. 
2. Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chi-
nese side on arms sales to Taiwan. 
3. Will not play any mediation role between Taipei and 
Peking. 
4. Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act. 
5. Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over 
Taiwan. 
6. Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotia-
tions with China.58 
58 The text was included in a statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, included in Harding, A Fragile 
Relationship, 389-390. 
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Comparing Clinton's "three noes" and recent events 
with these six points, it is hard to believe that there has 
been no change in U.S. policy. On the first two points: 
Arms sales are now essentially linked to the PRC. The 
PRC has pressured the U.S. to reduce arms sales to Tai-
wan in exchange for its cooperation in weapons prolifera-
tion to Iran or Pakistan. An increasing number of 
American officials now call for a moratorium of arms 
sales to Taiwan, because they argue that Taiwan has 
enough advanced weapons that need time to fully inte-
grate. The U.S. does not usually first take the initiative 
to discuss arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing. But because 
Beijing always raises this issue, it becomes a practical 
matter that the U.S. "consults" Beijing on arms sales to 
Taiwan. 
On points 3 and 6. The U.S. avows not to pressure 
Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing or to play an intermedi-
ary role between the two. But numerous "track two" for-
mer officials, such as William Perry, Joseph Nye, and 
Anthony Lake, have gone to Taipei and "encouraged" 
Taipei to talk with Beijing numerous times. Repeated 
"encouragement" can turn into pressure. It should also 
be mentioned that it was Beijing that stopped in 1995 the 
dialogue channel established since 1992 with Taiwan. 
In sum, Clinton's "three noes" represents a major dip-
lomatic victory for Beijing. China's official media 
reported Jiang Zemin making this conclusion. After 
1996, Chinese leaders discovered that the "closest road to 
Taipei goes through Washington." The "three noes" also 
further weakens Taiwan's international status, under-
mines its bargaining position, and calls into question the 
credibility of the residual U.S. commitment toward 
Taiwan. 
In addition to debating in abstract terms whether 
there has been a change and whether the change is for 
the better or worse through a careful content or model-
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ing, we can also ask how people perceive the policy. A 
poll of executives in ten Asian countries after Clinton's 
statement yields some interesting findings: First, 81.3 % of 
all respondents said that Taiwan's criticism of President 
Clinton's Taiwan-related remarks in China was "fair;" 
only 12.7% said Taiwan was "too harsh." Interestingly, a 
smaller percentage (69.3%) of respondents in Taiwan 
said that Taiwan's criticism was "fair," and 19.2% said it 
was "too harsh." In other words, other countries in the 
region were even more critical of Clinton's remarks. This 
implies that this poll is more credible than other polls 
that only survey "biased" executives in Taiwan. Second, 
54.2% of all respondents said Clinton's statements would 
weaken, and 21.9% said they would strengthen, Taipei's 
drive for international recognition (figures for executive 
in Taiwan: 42.3% and 30.8%, respectively). Third, 80% 
of the respondents (and 80.8% the respondents in Tai-
wan) said that U.S. support for the Chinese formula helps 
China's negotiation position vis-a-vis Taiwan's. Fourth, 
more than 45% of all respondents (and 46.1 % in Taiwan) 
said that U.S. support for China would make Taiwan 
more keen to seek independence.59 
These findings are empirical confirmations of my the-
sis that Clinton's "three noes" statement has caused neg-
ative consequences for Taiwan. Table 5 indicates the 
payoffs after the "three noes." 
As can be seen, this is the worst payoff for Taiwan (-
69), and the best for the PRC (69), for all the periods 
under this study. Is such a lop-sided payoff structure con-
ducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait? The 
final section discusses the repercussions of Clinton's 
"three noes" and speculate the impact of his remarks on 
Taiwan's future relationship with China. 
59 "Asian Executives Poll," The Far Eastern Economic Review (on line) (13 
August 1998), from the worldwide web, http://www.feer.com/Restricted/98aug_13/ 
poll.html. 
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Table 5. Model 5 - The "Three Noes" Paradigm 
Views on U.S. Taiwan PRC 
various government/ Taiwan people and government/ 
issues executive government oppositions T ruling party c 
Multi-party DPP, NP CCP (one-
democracy party dicta-
torship) 
How many One China, One divided One China; -10 One 10 
Chinas? no Taiwan China; one One Taiwan 
China, two 
governments 
Is Taiwan a Yes Separate No -10 Yes (rene- 10 
part of jurisdictions gade prov-
China? ince) 
Where is Beijing ? Beijing; -10 Beijing 10 
China's cap- Taiwan's in 
ital? Taipei 
View of the Maintain Legal gov- Legal gov- -9 Renegade 9 
governing unofficial ernment of ernment of 
authority on but strong territories Taiwan 
Taiwan ties rules by 
ROC 
View of the The sole Govern- Govern- -10 The sole 10 
governing legal gov- ment of ment of legal gov-
authority on ernment of mainland another ernment of 
the main- China state all China 
land 
What are Oppose They are They are -9 They are 9 
Taiwanese Taiwanese Taiwanese Taiwanese Chinese 
ethnically self-deter- and 
speaking? mination Chinese, 
not PRC 
citizens 
Nature & Peaceful Maintain Self-deter- -9 "China's in- 9 
solution to reunifica- status quo; mination by ternal affair 
the Taiwan tion under union after the 21 mil- - pressuring 
question Beijing mainland lion Taiwan "Hong 
democra- people Kong 
tizes model" 
U.S. arms Contingent -2 Increasing 2 
sales upon secur- military 




Total score Ts= -69 Cs= 69 
5. Repercussions of the "Three Noes" and 
Taiwan's Future 
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Several important developments immediately after 
the "three noes" already augured the fallout from the 
"three noes." They have important implications for Tai-
wan's future. 
First, Beijing began to quickly formalize the "three 
noes" diplomatic formula. A precedent set by the U.S. 
usually has a demonstration effect - as the effect of 
Nixon's China trip on Taiwan shows. Beijing succeeded 
in pressuring several countries, including the Philippines 
and Russia, to follow suit with the new "three noes." In 
late 1998, Jiang also sought to use his visit as a leverage 
to pressure Japan to include "three noes" in a new joint 
communique or to explicitly exclude Taiwan from the 
areas covered by the new guidelines of the revised U.S.-
Japan mutual defense treaty. This effort was 
unsuccessful. 
Second, Taiwan's voters reacted with more distrust 
about China. The percentage of respondents that 
answered that they considered China to be hostile to Tai-
wan shot up. The proportions of voters who favored 
either immediate or eventual independence now 
exceeded those who favored either immediate or even-
tual union."60 A poll conducted by a Nationalist Party 
lawmaker Tsai Bih-hwang in early August 1998 found 
that 23% of the 902 respondents said they backed a for-
mal break from the communist mainland, outstripping 
60 A poll conducted by the National Chengchi University's Election Study 
Center in August 1998 (N = 1097) found 12.9% of respondents favored "maintain 
the status quo, and independence later," 7.4% in favor of "declare independence 
immediately," 14.9% "maintain the status quo, and unification later," 0.8% 
"unification immediately," 15.3% "maintain the status quo indefinitely," and 
30.5% "maintain the status quo, and decide later." Data provided by Mainland 
Affairs Council, Taipei, May 1999. 
300 
13 % who supported an eventual reunion with China. 61 
Another poll conducted by the Chinese Euro-Asia Soci-
ety at the same time found that 61.2% of the 1149 
respondents thought that a cross-strait military confron-
tation in the future would be "unlikely" or "very 
unlikely." But the same poll found that 87.7% said they 
will stand up to fight for Taiwan if the mainland attacks 
the island. 62 
These poll results show early indications of two clash-
ing nationalisms: Taiwanese and Chinese. This is a worri-
some and potentially dangerous development. Clinton's 
"three noes" seeks to thwart one nationalism (Taiwan's) 
without curbing another (China's). It will not serve as a 
recipe for peace. 
In addition, Taiwan is unlikely to stop, although it 
may scale down, its annual campaign to reenter the U.N. 
Increasing diplomatic frustration is likely to help the 
opposition party, DPP, in the presidential elections in 
2000. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan, feeling increasingly insecure, 
may become more inclined to seek military security. For 
example, Gerald Segal wrote about the ambiguous status 
of Taiwan's nuclear programs, indicating that Taiwan 
might consider developing nuclear weapons as a trump 
card for its survival. 63 Taiwan is also now more interested 
in being included in the deployment of the Theater Mis-
sile Defense (TMD) system. Neither development will 
please China. 
61 "Politician's Death Fuels Taiwan Independence Mood," CNN Interactive 
(9 August 1998), from Reuters, at http:llcnn.comJWORLD/asiapcf/98081081 
RB000/42.reut.html. 
62 Sofia Wu, "Taiwan People Willing to Fight for Homeland: Poll," CNA (8 
August 1998), http:/lwww.taipei.org/teco/cicdnews/english/e-08-08-98/e-08-08-98-
2.htm. 
63 Gerald Segal, "The Myth and Reality of Taiwan's Nuclear Weapons 
Programs," Chinese translation in The Central Daily News (international edition) 
(5 August 1998): 6; originally published in The Asian Wall Street Journal. 
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But most importantly, the "three noes" have strength-
ened the PRC's hand vis-a-vis Taiwan. Beijing will no 
doubt ride the wave of its diplomatic victory to further 
isolate Taiwan internationally. There exists a danger, 
namely the PRC may be misled to think that the interna-
tional community will stand idly by if it decides to use 
force to bring Taiwan into the fold. 
The "three noes" sought to construct a modus vivendi 
that will help prevent war in the Taiwan Strait - a 
"flashpoint" after the Cold War in the eyes of many ana-
lysts. However, it is an intrinsically unstable one, 
because it fails to involve Taiwan in the process and fails 
to take into account Taiwan people's legitimate interests. 
This is especially deplorable, now that Taiwan is a democ-
racy. It may have helped to mollify Chinese anger. But it 
has also sowed the seeds for instability for the region and 
danger for the United States. 
Finally, I will use a simple game-theoretical model to 
examine the various scenarios of Taiwan's future status 
vis-a-vis China. The distinctive contribution of this 
model is that it underscores the importance of China's 
democratization for Taiwan's future - a point few schol-
ars have ever considered. 
In Figure 1, the first key "decision," for the first 
player, China, is whether to democratize. The second 
key decision, for Taiwan, is whether to separate or unify 
with China - either peacefully or forcefully. We further 
assume the following preference-ranking: 
For the PRC: union > status quo > separation; 
peaceful outcome > forceful outcome 
For the KMT: status quo > separation > union; 
peaceful outcome > forceful outcome 
For the DPP: separation > status quo > union; 
peaceful outcome > forceful outcome 
These strategic decisions result in six different 
outcomes (scenarios). We assign a payoff of 6 for the 
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best outcome, 5 the second best ... , and 1 the worst. In 
each bracket, the first payoff is PRC's, the second the 




Figure 1: Scenarios of Taiwan's Future Status 
vis-a-vis China 
I: Amicable separation (1,5,6) 
Separation 




Union III: "Democratic" conquest (3,2,3) 
IV: Military conquest (4,1,1) 
Union 
Not democratize Peaceful 
V: "One country, two systems" plus (6,3,2) 
Taiwan 
Separation 
VI: Spiteful separation (2,4,5) 
Scenarfo 1 (1, 5, 6), "amicable separation," is for Tai-
wan to peacefully separate from China permanently after 
China becomes democratic. This is the best outcome for 
the DPP, but the worst for the PRC. Scenario 2 (5, 6, 4), 
"democratic confederation," is for Taiwan and China to 
peacefully form some type of political union after China 
becomes democratic. This is the KMT's best outcome 
(according to its official rhetoric), but second best for 
China. Scenario 5 (6, 3, 2), "one country, two systems-
plus," is for Taiwan to unify with China without China 
becoming democratic. This is the PRC's best outcome, 
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but a bad one for the KMT and the DPP. But the worst 
outcome for the KMT and the DPP is Scenario 4(4, 1, 1), 
"military conquest." 
Although these three players' payoff structures differ, 
the outcome with the highest sum of payoffs is the one 
most acceptable to most players. The following ranking 
order emerges: 
Democratic confederation > amicable separation > "one 
country, two systems" plus = spiteful separation > "demo-
cratic" conquest > military conquest 
"Democratic confederation" is the best outcome for 
all at the aggregate level, and "military conquest" is the 
worst, with "one country, two systems" plus falling in 
between. 
Herein lies an important lesson for China: the best 
hope for Taiwan to ever unify with China is for China to 
democratize ("democratic confederation"). However, by 
democratizing, China also risks losing Taiwan without 
force. This is China's dilemma. On the contrary, acquisi-
tion of Taiwan through military conquest does not pay. 
Clinton's "three noes" policy has ushered in a new era 
in Taiwan-China relations. Although it seems to preclude 
the option of separation to Taiwan, it also indirectly 
forces China to democratize by increasing the probabili-
ties of certain scenarios (e.g., 2 and 1 ). Hopefully the 
shortened list of outcomes serves to clarify for all players 
the few good outcomes and encourage them to move 
toward these goals, rather than restricting their choices to 
clearly inferior ones. 
